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In California, molecular testing was useful in decreas-
ing suspicion for severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), by detecting common respiratory pathogens
(influenza A/B, human metapneumovirus, picornavirus,
Mycoplasma pneumoniae, Chlamydia spp., parainfluenza
virus, respiratory syncytial virus, and adenovirus) in 23
(45%) of 51 patients with suspected SARS and 9 (47%) of
19 patients with probable SARS. 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has becomethe new paradigm for the global havoc that can be pro-
duced by an emerging infectious disease (1). As of July 31,
2003, a total of 8,096 probable SARS cases had been
reported to the World Health Organization from 29 coun-
tries or areas, with 774 deaths and a case-fatality ratio of
9.6% (2). California was particularly affected by the SARS
outbreak, reporting one fifth of suspect or probable cases in
the United States (15% of suspect SARS cases and 26% of
probable SARS cases), with two serologically confirmed
cases. In 2002, the California Unexplained Pneumonia
(CUP) Project, a respiratory surveillance project that uses
enhanced laboratory techniques to identify etiologic agents
of severe pneumonia, was initiated at the California
Department of Health Services (CDHS) in collaboration
with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) Emerging Infections Program. The CUP project’s
extensive diagnostic testing algorithm was applied to spec-
imens submitted to CDHS for SARS testing.
The Study
From March 12, 2003, through July 30, 2003, cases of
possible SARS reported to the CDHS were classified as
suspect, probable, or laboratory-confirmed, according to
CDC criteria (3). Extensive diagnostic testing was per-
formed at the CDHS Viral and Rickettsial Disease
Laboratory on specimens from 165 patients, including
those with conditions that did not meet strict CDC case cri-
teria (Table 1). 
Submitted specimens were transported on cold pack
and either frozen at –70°C or processed immediately. A
total of 281 respiratory specimens and 78 serum specimens
were analyzed, including 210 nasopharyngeal swabs, 23
nasal swabs, 17 throat swabs, 15 nasal washes, 11 sputum
specimens, 5 endotracheal aspirates, 39 single acute-phase
serum specimens, and 39 acute- and convalescent-phase
paired serum specimens. Convalescent-phase serum spec-
imens were collected at least 28 days after symptom onset.
Because of difficulties obtaining convalescent-phase sera,
specimens from only 32 case-patients underwent com-
bined testing by polymerase chain reaction (PCR), culture,
and serologic methods. 
Total nucleic acid was extracted from all respiratory
specimens for reverse transcriptase (RT)-PCR by using the
MasterPure Complete DNA and RNA Purification Kit
(Epicentre Technologies, Madison, WI). RT-PCR assays
were performed according to Erdman et al. (5) with
primers for respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), parainfluen-
za virus (PIV) types 1–3, and influenza A and B; PIV 4 (6);
coronavirus (CoV) 229E reverse primer (7), and human
metapneumovirus (HMPV) (8). Primers for CoV OC43
and CoV 229E forward primer were modified from Myint
et al. (9). We used adenovirus and picornavirus primers
(adenovirus: forward primer 5′- CCC(AC)TT(CT)AAC-
CACCACCG -3′ and reverse 5′- ACATCCTT(GCT)C-
(GT)GA AGTTCCA -3′; picornavirus: forward primer 5′-
GGCCCCTGAATG(CT)GGCTAA-3′ and reverse 5′-GA-
AACACGGACACCCAAAGTA-3′). Reaction products
were visualized on ethidium bromide–stained agarose gels
with ultraviolet illumination. RT-PCR for SARS-CoV was
performed on an iCycler (BioRad Laboratories, Inc.,
Hercules, CA) by using the TaqMan One-step RT-PCR
Master Mix (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA) with
primers and probes developed at CDC. 
Based on β-actin gene amplification, specimens from
151 patients were suitable for molecular testing. In 63
(42%) of these, RT-PCR detected a respiratory pathogen
(Table 2). No patient had more than one agent identified by
molecular methods. In addition, respiratory samples with
adequate volume were added to Vero E6, primary rhesus
monkey kidney cells, and human fetal diploid lung cells,
according to standard diagnostic procedures. Viruses were
isolated from 16 (10%) of 154 patients (Table 2). All spec-
imens yielding positive viral cultures were also positive by
RT-PCR. Overall, RT-PCR assays were more sensitive
than culture; for example, of the 26 patients who had
influenza A detected by RT-PCR, 9 were culture-positive.
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Serologic testing was performed on specimens from 78
patients (Table 2). A significant rise in immunoglobulin
(Ig) G was seen in 10 of the 39 patients who had paired
acute- and convalescent-phase serum specimens (M. pneu-
moniae [2 patients], influenza A [4 patients], 1 each of
Chlamydia spp., RSV, influenza B, and adenovirus). Of the
39 patients from whom a single serum sample was collect-
ed, two patients had detectable IgM (one each of
Chlamydia spp. and M. pneumoniae). The patient with M.
pneumoniae also had influenza A detected by PCR and cul-
ture; this patient was the only one with evidence of possi-
ble co-infection. Seven putative causal agents were
identified by serologic testing alone without corresponding
positive findings by PCR or culture, including one each of
influenza A, influenza B, RSV, and adenovirus. PCR
assays performed retrospectively on specimens from
patients with positive serologic results for M. pneumoniae
and Chlamydia spp were negative for those organisms.
Specimens from an additional two patients showed rises in
IgG to multiple antigens, consistent with a nonspecific
immune response. No respiratory specimens were positive
for SARS-CoV by RT-PCR, although serologic tests of
samples from two patients were positive for SARS-CoV
antibody.
Sequence analyses confirmed the identity of HMPV and
influenza A RT-PCR amplification products. A BLAST
(available from: www.ncbi.hlm.nih.gov/BLAST) compari-
son of five putative HMPV specimens showed identity to
HMPV sequences in GenBank. Similarly, influenza A
amplification products from 12 patients identified solely by
RT-PCR showed homology to known influenza A viruses.
Of the 165 patients tested, 51 (31%) met the criteria for
suspect SARS, 19 (12%) met the criteria for probable
SARS, and 2 had serologically confirmed SARS (Table 3).
A likely pathogen was detected in 23 (45%) of the 51 sus-
pect and 9 (47%) of the 19 probable SARS patients (Table
3). RT-PCR was the most sensitive diagnostic method,
identifying a likely causal agent in 21 (41%) suspect SARS
patients (influenza A [10 patients], HMPV [4 patients],
picornavirus [4 patients], influenza B [1 patient], RSV [1
patient], and PIV3 [1 patient]) and 6 (32%) probable
SARS patients (influenza A [4 patients] and HMPV [2
patients]). Serologic testing identified a likely etiologic
agent in specimens from an additional 6 patients who met
CDC criteria: 3 (16%) for suspect SARS (influenza A [1
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Table 1. Respiratory testing algorithma 
Respiratory specimens Serologic testingb 
Viral culture 
Acute-phase serum  
specimens: IgM 
Polymerase chain reaction Chlamydia spp. 
Influenza A  Mycoplasma pneumoniae 
Influenza B Paired serum specimens: IgG 
Respiratory syncytial virus Chlamydia spp. 
Parainfluenza virus types 1–4 M. pneumoniae 
Human metapneumovirus Influenza A and B 
Coronavirus OC43 and 229E Respiratory syncytial virus 
Adenovirus  Parainfluenza virus types 
2–4 
Picornavirus Adenovirus 
SARS-CoV SARS-CoV 
aIg, immunoglobulin; SARS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome–
associated coronavirus. 
bAll serologic assays were in-house enzyme immunoassays (4), except for 
the Meridian IgM assay for M. pneumoniae (Meridian Bioscience, Inc., 
Cincinnati, OH) and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay of the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention for SARS-CoV 
 
Table 2. Detection of respiratory pathogens by polymerase chain reaction (PCR), culture, and serologic testing for cases tested at the 
California Department of Health Servicesa 
 PCR (N = 151); n (%) Culture (N = 154); n (%) Serologic testingb (N = 78); n (%) 
Influenza A 27 (18)c 9 (6) 4 (5)d 
Influenza B 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)d 
Respiratory syncytial virus 5 (3) 1 (1) 1 (1)d 
Parainfluenza virus types 2–4 6 (5) 5 (4) 0 
Human metapneumovirus 11 (7) 0 ND 
Coronavirus OC43 1 (1) 0 ND 
Coronavirus 229E 0 0 ND 
Parainfluenza virus type 1 0 0 ND 
Adenovirus 0 0 1 (1)d 
Picornavirus 12 (8) 0 ND 
Mycoplasma pneumoniae 0e ND 3 (4)c 
Chlamydia spp. 0e ND 1 (1) 
SARS-CoV 0 0 2 (3) 
Total positive 63 (42) 16 (10) 13 (17) 
aND, not done; SARS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome–associated coronavirus. 
bMeasured as a significant rise in immunoglobulin (Ig) G in paired serum samples for all specimens except one positive for M. pneumoniae IgM. 
cSpecimens from one case-patient positive for influenza A (by PCR and culture) were also positive for M. pneumoniae IgM. 
dOne specimen negative by culture. 
eMycoplasma pneumoniae and Chlamydia pneumoniae PCRs were performed retrospectively only on specimens from patients with serologic evidence of 
M. pneumoniae (n = 3) and Chlamydia spp. (n = 1) infection. 
patient], influenza B [1 patient] and adenovirus [1 patient])
and 3 (16%) for probable SARS  (M. pneumoniae [2
patients] and Chlamydia spp. [1 patient]). HMPV, whose
role in SARS-CoV infection remains undefined, was
detected by PCR in four patients with suspect SARS and 2
patients with probable SARS. 
Discussion
From March to July 2003, California reported more
patients who met criteria for suspect and probable SARS
than any other state. Many emergency rooms, hospitals,
and public health offices were overwhelmed. Hundreds of
persons were evaluated by local counties before being
reported to CDHS, where they were classified as having
suspect or probable SARS. Of these patients, more than
one-third had a pathogen detected that was considered a
likely cause of their condition based on their clinical fea-
tures and course of illness. Twenty-one (81%) of these
pathogens were identified by RT-PCR within an average of
4 days. In California, determining a commonly recognized
cause for an influenzalike illness allowed cases to be
removed from the suspect or probable SARS categories.
The resultant removal of a SARS designation alleviated
the required epidemiologic investigation, hospitalization
or isolation, strict infection control precautions, and addi-
tional specimen collection and contact tracing. 
Although viral or bacterial co-infection with SARS
remains possible, only a few SARS-CoV–infected case-
patients worldwide have had documented evidence of dual
infection, including C. pneumoniae, M. pneumoniae, and
HMPV (10–13). Most case reports of laboratory-con-
firmed SARS are noteworthy for the lack of other viral
agents (11,14,15). Accordingly, SARS can be ruled out
when common culprit viral pathogens are detected in areas
without known community transmission of SARS.
However, several factors should be considered before dis-
continuing further evaluation for possible SARS when a
likely alternative cause has been identified, including the
following: 1) the strength of the epidemiologic link to
SARS, 2) specificity of the diagnostic testing performed,
and 3) the clinical features and course of illness for the
alternative diagnosis. Should SARS become reestablished,
these exclusion criteria may need to be reevaluated and
applied with particular caution in patients with strong epi-
demiologic exposure in the context of community trans-
mission. 
Applying molecular techniques to outbreak investiga-
tions is a relatively recent approach. The limitations of
molecular testing include the possibility of false-positive
results caused by specimen contamination during process-
ing and false-negative results from primer mismatch or
inhibitors in the specimen. Ideally, in the diagnostic set-
ting, positive results by molecular techniques should be
confirmed by either testing another specimen by the same
method or the same specimen by another method, such as
immunoassays or culture. Also, detecting an agent by PCR
does not always indicate the true cause of infection; it may
instead signify nasopharyngeal carriage or simply be an
“innocent bystander.”
Nevertheless, given the nonspecific initial signs and
symptoms of patients with SARS, the capacity to rapidly
diagnose common respiratory infections by using sensitive
PCR methods offers advantages in the context of a respira-
tory outbreak. We found that applying a broad diagnostic
molecular panel during the SARS outbreak enabled timely
identification of agents of common respiratory viral infec-
tions in more than one third of patients with suspect or
probable SARS cases. Although serologic testing aided
SARS and Common Viral Infections
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Table 3. Summary of positive laboratory results at the California Department of Health Services by CDC case criteriaa,b 
Pathogen 
Total (N = 165) 
n (%) 
Suspect (N = 51) 
n (%) 
Probable (N = 19) 
n (%) 
Confirmed (N = 2) 
n (%) 
Non-SARS cases 
(N = 94) n (%) 
Influenza A 28 (17)c 11 (22) 4 (21) 0 13 (14) 
Influenza B 2 (1) 1 (2) 0 0 1 (1) 
Respiratory syncytial virus 6 (4) 1 (2) 0 0 5 (5) 
Parainfluenza virus types 2–4 6 (5) 1 (2) 0 0 5 (5) 
Human metapneumovirus 11 (7) 4 (8) 2 (11) 0 5 (5) 
Coronavirus OC43 1 (1) 0 0 0 1 (0) 
Coronavirus 229E 0 0 0 0 0 
Parainfluenza virus type 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Adenovirus 1 (1) 1 (2) 0 0 0 
Picornavirus 12 (7) 4 (8) 0 0 8 (9) 
Mycoplasma pneumoniae 3 (2)c 0 2 (11) 0 1 (1) 
Chlamydia spp. 1 (1) 0 1 (5) 0 0 
SARS-CoVd 2 (1) 0  2 (100) 0 
Total positive 73 (44) 23 (45) 9 (47) 2 (100) 39 (42) 
aUsing criteria for suspect, probable, or laboratory-confirmed severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) recommended by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC). 
b Includes polymerase chain reaction (PCR), culture, and serologic tests. 
cOne patient had evidence of co-infection with both influenza A (PCR and culture) and M. pneumoniae (immunoglobulin [Ig] M detection). 
dSARS-CoV, SARS-associated coronavirus. 
identification of selected atypical pathogens, the require-
ment for paired serum specimens did not allow timely
removal of a SARS designation. Even when a rapid and
definitive diagnostic test for SARS becomes available, lab-
oratories capable of performing molecular-based diagnos-
tic testing, especially for influenza, should be maintained
and strengthened.
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